Adams, Ferrone & Ferrone

What they litigate

Disputed issues across the decisions this firm is named in. Every row opens the decisions it counts.

Where they appear

• Bakersfield 11
• Oxnard 5
• San Bernardino 4
• San Diego 4
• Van Nuys 3
• Anaheim 2
• Fresno 2
• Santa Ana 1

How the appealed decisions came out

These are decisions that were appealed and published — the tail of a system that mostly settles. Most claims end in a compromise and release or a stipulation and never reach a panel, so nothing below describes how this firm does its work. It describes how a set of appealed disputes came out.

• 20 for the applicant
• 6 for the defense
• 5 returned for more record

Counted over 31 appealed decisions. Not this firm’s book of work.

Decisions

Newest decisions this firm is named in, each with the passage the panel turned on and a link to the official PDF.

• ADJ12936570 · 2026-02-17 · San Diego District OfficeAOE/COEremanded

  Determinative passage · p.4statutory presumption; however, the parties have not established whether applicant is subject to

  The Board found that the parties had not established whether the presumption applies, so the issue of rebuttal was premature; the QME report was inadequate to rebut the presumption; thus, the matter was returned to the trial level for further proceedings to determine applicability of the presumption.

  Official decision · page 4 →
• ADJ11428234 · 2025-10-17 · San Diego District OfficeAOE/COEremanded

  Determinative passage · p.7In the instant case, the QME's opinion regarding whether the applicant's current claim for his heart/hypertension is an exacerbation of the prior injuries or an aggravation, and thus a new injury, is unclear. Dr. Acheatel has opined that applicant's hypertension was "a continuation of a previous injury with cumulative involvement since 2005, up until retirement." (Joint Trial Exhibit #1, at p. 7.) In his deposition, Dr. Acheatel testified that it is his medical opinion that applicant's hypertension exacerbated by continuing to work as a correctional officer for defendant. (Joint Trial Exhibit #7, at p. 43.) However, Dr. Acheatel then also testified that applicant's hypertension worsened over time because "his blood pressure was more difficult to control." (Id. at p. 45.) It appears that Dr. Acheatel may misunderstand the legal distinction between an exacerbation and an aggravation. The QME's testimony and reporting is at times, contradictory, and consequently is not substantial medical evidence.

  The WCAB found the QME's medical opinion unclear and contradictory regarding whether the applicant's hypertension was an aggravation (new injury) or an exacerbation (not a new injury), and thus not substantial evidence. The WCAB remanded for further proceedings to clarify this issue and to determine applicability of presumption under Labor Code sections 3212.2 and 3212.10.

  Official decision · page 7 →
• ADJ10863775 · 2025-07-25 · Bakersfield District OfficePermanent disability ratingdeferred

  Determinative passage · p.5We believe that the issue of applicant's proper occupational group must be reanalyzed, including the determination of the above unresolved issues. To the extent it is found that applicant is not bound by the representation on the Pre-Trial Conference Statement, the parties and the WCJ should further develop the evidentiary record on this issue, as the current record is not clear with regard to the applicant's work duties.

  The issue of the proper occupational group was not decided and is deferred for further analysis due to unresolved stipulation and evidentiary issues.

  Official decision · page 5 →
• ADJ12674446 · 2024-08-16 · Anaheim District OfficeAOE/COEapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.8II. Turning to the merits of the petition, section 3600(a)(9) states, in pertinent part, that compensation does not exist where an injury arises "... out of voluntary participation in any off- duty recreational, social, or athletic activity not constituting part of the employee's work-related duties, except where these activities are a reasonable expectancy of, or are expressly or impliedly required by, the employment." (§ 3600(a)(9).) In determining whether off-duty physical fitness activities constitute an industrial injury, the Appeals Board must determine whether the exercise is a reasonable expectancy of employment, which consists of two elements: (1) whether the employee subjectively believes that exercise is expected by the employer, and (2) whether that subjective belief is objectively reasonable. (Ezzy v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 252, 260 [48 Cal.Comp.Cases 611].) Here, defendant first argues that applicant did not have a subjective belief that exercise is expected by the employer. The evidence clearly shows that defendant mandated physical fitness as a condition of employment. Firefighters were required to log 91 hours of fitness each year. Objectively, exercise was required by the employer. Accordingly, applicant met the burden of proving a subjective reasonable belief that exercise was required.

  Applicant was required by employer to exercise 91 hours per year, establishing a subjective and objectively reasonable belief that exercise was expected as part of employment, supporting industrial injury compensability.

  Official decision · page 8 →
• ADJ11354883 · 2024-04-25 · San Diego District OfficeApportionmentremanded

  Determinative passage · p.1OPINION AND DECISION AFTER RECONSIDERATION We previously granted defendant's Petition for Reconsideration of the Findings and Award (F&A) issued on June 26, 2020, by the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ), in order to further study the factual and legal issues. This is our Opinion and Decision After Reconsideration. The WCJ found, in pertinent part, that applicant's permanent partial disability rated to 75% after apportionment per Labor Code1, section 4664, but used a "range of evidence" analysis and reduced by the value of the permanent disability award by the monetary value of a prior award of permanent disability and did not subtract the percentage. Defendant contends that the WCJ erred because the opinion does not follow the California Supreme Court's holding in Brodie v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2007) 40 Cal. 4th 1313, 57 Cal. Rptr.

  The WCJ erred in using a 'range of evidence' approach rather than the method mandated by Brodie, which requires subtracting the old rating from the new rating to calculate the percentage of disability attributable to the new injury.

  Official decision · page 1 →
• ADJ13173690 · 2023-02-07 · Oxnard District OfficeAOE/COEapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.5The parties proceeded to trial on June 8, 2021, framing issues of injury AOE/COE, the date of injury, and the applicability of the presumption of section 3212.8. The WCJ issued the F&A on June 29, 2021, finding in pertinent part that applicant sustained the burden of proof to establish injury during the period December 18, 2019 through January 9, 2020, and that applicant's injury was presumed to arise out of and in the course of employment pursuant to Labor Code section 3212.8. (F&A, Findings of Fact, Nos. 1 and 2.)

  Applicant is a member of the class covered by Labor Code section 3212.8 and developed a disease caused by a blood-borne pathogen, Citrobacter koseri, which is transmissible via blood, triggering the presumption of industrial causation. Defendant failed to rebut the presumption with affirmative evidence, so the injury is found industrial.

  Official decision · page 5 →
• ADJ9599844 · 2022-12-29 · Bakersfield District OfficeCumulative traumaapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.3Having reviewed the trial record, we agree with the WCJ that based on the reports and deposition testimony of the internal medicine agreed medical examiner (AME) Seymour Levine, M.D., and the Labor Code section 3212.1 presumption, the cause of applicant's lymphatic cancer was his 27 years of employment by defendant as a deputy sheriff. (Report, p. 4; F&A, p. 5, Amended Opinion on Decision.) When multiple body parts are injured contemporaneously, such as during an identical cumulative trauma period, they are considered a single injury. (State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Hurley) (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 599 [42 Cal.Comp.Cases 481]; see also Hegglin v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 162 [36 Cal.Comp.Cases 93].)

  The Board agreed with the WCJ and AME Dr. Seymour Levine that the lymphatic cancer was caused by employment and constituted a cumulative injury merged with the prior cardiovascular injury, consistent with statutory and case law.

  Official decision · page 3 →
• ADJ12932864 · 2022-09-19 · San Bernardino District OfficePermanent disability ratingapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.1Defendant seeks reconsideration of our Decision After Reconsideration of June 24, 2022, wherein we found that while employed as a correctional officer during a cumulative period ending on June 6, 2017, applicant sustained industrial injury to his heart and in the form of hypertension causing permanent disability of 54%. In so finding, we amended a workers' compensation administrative law judge's (WCJ) Findings, Award and Order of March 29, 2022, wherein it was found that applicant's injury had caused permanent disability of 29% after Labor Code section 4663 apportionment of permanent disability.

  The Board found that the applicant's heart trouble developed during his service, making the heart trouble presumption applicable and exempting the permanent disability from apportionment under Labor Code section 4663(e).

  Official decision · page 1 →
• ADJ10475606 · 2022-09-13 · Anaheim District OfficePsyche AOE/COEdefendant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.3Applicant has filed a timely and verified petition for reconsideration wherein she disputes the Findings and Order dated 6/21/20222 finding that applicant did not sustain injury to her psyche while employed during the period 05/17/2006 through 01/11/2016 as an office assistant for the Department of Social Services. Applicant contends that the finding that she did not sustain an industrial injury is not based on substantial medical evidence

  The applicant did not sustain a compensable psychiatric injury because the medical evidence showed her psychiatric diagnoses were predominantly caused by non-industrial factors, not work stress, consistent with Labor Code section 3208.3 requirements.

  Official decision · page 3 →
• ADJ8539095 · 2022-08-10 · Bakersfield District OfficePsyche AOE/COEapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.3The parties proceeded to trial, and on December 3, 2019, the WCJ issued the F&O, determining in relevant part that applicant sustained injury arising out of and in the course of employment (AOE/COE), and that the injury was not substantially caused by lawful, nondiscriminatory, good faith personnel action. (F&O, dated December 3, 2019, Findings of Fact Nos. 1 and 3.) In her Opinion on Decision, the WCJ explained that applicant's injury was predominantly caused by actual events of employment, and that the appointments of Dr. Bindler

  The WCJ and WCAB found that actual events of employment were the predominant cause of the psychiatric injury and that the employer's administrative appointments were not personnel actions under section 3208.3(h), so the good faith personnel action defense failed.

  Official decision · page 3 →
• ADJ12932864 · 2022-06-24 · San Bernardino District OfficePermanent disability ratingapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.1Applicant seeks reconsideration of a workers' compensation administrative law judge's (WCJ) Findings, Award and Order of March 29, 2022, wherein it was found that, while employed as a correctional officer during a cumulative period ending on June 6, 2017, applicant sustained industrial injury to his heart and in the form of hypertension causing permanent disability of 29% after apportionment.

  Applicant's heart trouble developed during employment as a correctional officer, triggering the presumption under Labor Code section 3212.2, which exempts the permanent disability from apportionment under Labor Code section 4663(e).

  Official decision · page 1 →
• ADJ12139544 · 2022-04-25 · Van Nuys District OfficeDeath benefitsapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.5his report, Dr. Leoni did not rebut the presumption of Labor Code section 3212.1 that the applicant's cancer was industrial, but he found that the applicant's death was not related to the presumably industrial cancer, but was instead due to perforation of a non-industrial duodenal ulcer, which led to septic shock (Joint Exhibit 1, QME Report of Sean Leoni, M.D., 6/8/2020, p. 41, lines 3-7). At his cross-examination of February 1, 2021, Dr. Leoni at first clearly confirmed this opinion, then, later in the deposition, distinguished the causes of death reflected on the applicant's death certificate-- pericardial tamponade due to duodenal perforation, acute renal failure, and lung cancer--as a main cause and lesser causes that all "played a role" in the applicant's death:

  The QME Dr. Leoni's deposition testimony established that the presumed industrial lung cancer played at least a minor contributing role in the applicant's death, which is sufficient for compensability under California law.

  Official decision · page 5 →

Also recorded as

The same firm is printed several ways across the decisions, and all of them were counted as one. This is every spelling behind the figures above.

• ADAMS, FERRONE & FERRONE
• ADAMS FERRONE & FERRONE
• LAW OFFICES OF ADAMS, FERRONE & FERRONE
• Adams, Ferrone & Ferrone
• ADAMS FERRONE
• Law Offices of Adams, Ferrone and Ferrone
• LAW OFFICE OF ADAMS, FERRONE & FERRONE
• ADAMS, FERRONE AND FERRONE
• Adams Ferrone and Ferrone
• Adams Ferrone & Ferrone
• ADAMS, FERRONE &FERRONE

Is this your firm and something here is wrong? Tell us and we will fix it. Every figure on this page is a count of released decisions this firm is named in, and the decisions themselves are listed above with the passage each turned on.