Lewis, Marenstein, Wicke, Sherwin & Lee

What they litigate

Disputed issues across the decisions this firm is named in. Every row opens the decisions it counts.

Where they appear

• Van Nuys 31
• Los Angeles 6
• Fresno 2
• Oxnard 2
• Riverside 2
• San Bernardino 2
• San Francisco 1

How the appealed decisions came out

These are decisions that were appealed and published — the tail of a system that mostly settles. Most claims end in a compromise and release or a stipulation and never reach a panel, so nothing below describes how this firm does its work. It describes how a set of appealed disputes came out.

• 28 for the applicant
• 12 for the defense
• 6 returned for more record

Counted over 43 appealed decisions. Not this firm’s book of work. A decision that went one way on one issue and the other way on another is counted in both columns, so the figures add up to more than the total.

Decisions

Newest decisions this firm is named in, each with the passage the panel turned on and a link to the official PDF.

• ADJ22400130 · 2026-06-01 · Los Angeles District OfficeAOE/COEremanded

  Determinative passage · p.10Applicant's first case of COVID was in February 2020 and thus pre-dates the COVID presumptions. Sections 3212.87 and 3212.88 were repealed effective January 1, 2024, thus dates of injury in December 2020 and November 2022 fall squarely within these sections. Section 3212.87(b)(1), which covers peace officers such as applicant, requires that "The employee has tested positive for COVID-19 within 14 days after a day that the employee performed labor or services at the employee's place of employment at the employer's direction." If the injured worker meets the criteria set forth in the section, section 3212.87(b)(2) states that "The date of injury shall be the last date the employee performed labor or services at the employee's place of employment at the employer's direction prior to the positive test." Here, the AME was not provided a positive test result for the December 2020 case of COVID-19, so he did not perform his analysis of industrial causation under the rubric of section 3212.87. It is unclear why he did not apply the criteria of section 3212.87 to his review of applicant's November 2022 case.

  The WCAB found that the applicant had three distinct COVID-19 infections and that they could not be merged into one cumulative injury. The AME's determination regarding the third infection was not substantial medical evidence. The case was returned for further medical reporting to determine the number and nature of injuries and apportionment.

  Official decision · page 10 →
• ADJ22325507 · 2026-05-11 · Los Angeles District OfficeApportionmentdefendant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.3II. In addition to the reasons stated by the WCA, we note the following observations. The WCA, in significant part, based the opinion in this matter upon the recent panel decision of Canto Shadoan v. City of San Diego. (91 Cal.Comp.Cases 352, 2025 Cal.Work.Comp. P.D. LEXIX 435 (writ den.).). On April 29, 2026, the Fourth District Court of Appeal denied review in Canto Shadoan with an unpublished opinion expressing agreement with the logic of the case. The WCA did not find apportionment based upon causation in this matter. Both of applicant's disabilities were rated using the exact same method contained in the AMA Guides, which was range of motion. Both AMEs in both cases found that applicant's impairment was 100% industrial in accordance with section 4663(e). Both disability awards are based upon a finding of 100% industrial causation.

  The WCAB found that apportionment under section 4664 by the subtraction method is allowed despite the anti-attribution clause of section 4663(e) because the prior award overlaps the present award and both use the same AMA Guides rating method.

  Official decision · page 3 →
• ADJ16790298 · 2026-01-09 · Van Nuys District OfficeApportionmentapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.5Here, for the reasons stated in the WCJ's Report, we agree with the WCJ that the opinion of AME Dr. Heskiaoff on the issue of apportionment does not constitute substantial medical evidence. "[T]he mere fact that a report `addresses' the issue of causation of the permanent disability and makes an `apportionment determination' by finding the approximate relative percentages of industrial and non-industrial causation does not necessarily render the report one upon which the WCAB may rely." (Escobedo, supra, 70 Cal.Comp.Cases at p. 620.)

  The WCJ and WCAB found that the AME's apportionment opinion lacked substantial medical evidence as it did not meet the required criteria of reasonable medical probability, adequate explanation, and was speculative and unclear.

  Official decision · page 5 →
• ADJ21635072 · 2026-01-05 · Los Angeles District OfficeApportionmentapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.73. The Arbitrator found that apportionment pursuant Labor Code § 4664(b) to a prior permanent disability Award to the lumbar spine is precluded by the anti-attribution clause in Labor Code § 4663(e), and therefore the applicant is entitled to an Award without apportionment.

  The anti-attribution clause in Labor Code 4663(e) precludes apportionment to prior awards for presumptively compensable injuries; defendant failed to provide substantial evidence of overlap to meet burden of proof for apportionment under Labor Code 4664(b).

  Official decision · page 7 →
• ADJ7688671 · 2025-04-14 · Van Nuys District OfficeSerious and willful misconductdeferred

  Determinative passage · p.13FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The WCAB has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate claims under Labor Code section 4553.

  The WCAB has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate claims under section 4553, and the civil settlement did not settle the claim for increased compensation under section 4553. The issue of whether defendant's conduct constituted a serious and willful violation is deferred for further proceedings.

  Official decision · page 13 →
• ADJ15563281 · 2025-03-17 · Van Nuys District OfficeSubstantial evidence / credibilityapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.184. Whether Medical Reporting of Fred Kuyt, M.D. is Substantial Evidence. Defendant argues that the reporting of Dr. Kuyt is not substantial evidence as he did not provide the parties with the peer reviewed studies he had read throughout his career on the issue of causation of testicular cancer. Presumably, the Agreed Medical Evaluator was chosen by both parties because of his expertise and neutrality. Therefore, his opinion should carry great weight. It would have been better for the parties if the doctor provided some of the peer reviewed studies that he testified he has reviewed throughout his career. However, his failure to provide the articles does not make his reporting inadmissible. If there were any studies that contradicted the doctor's opinions they could have been offered by defendant and the Agreed Medical Evaluator could have been cross-examined to alter his opinion and considered by the Arbitrator.

  The Agreed Medical Evaluator's opinion was found to be substantial evidence despite the lack of peer-reviewed studies provided, as the evaluator was chosen for expertise and neutrality and no contradictory studies were presented.

  Official decision · page 18 →
• ADJ10470278 · 2025-03-03 · Van Nuys District OfficeTemporary disabilityapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.5There is no dispute regarding the end date of the temporary disability period. In the agreed medical examiner Jon Greenfield, M.D.'s report dated August 15, 2022, in the discussion section it states "Dr. Chon, in his note of 7/21/2016, indicated that the applicant was totally temporarily disabled." The undersigned WCJ incorrectly believed that was the first time Dr. Chon placed Applicant on temporary disability. However, in the record review section of the report it states "on 2/18/2016, the applicant was placed on temporary disability as of 2/18/2016." Applicant's petition for reconsideration it is correct and should be granted. The undersigned WCJ's award should be modified by the recon unit or returned to the trial court, to correct: the period of temporary disability; period where Labor Code § 4850 benefits should be paid; and the period and rate at which temporary disability should be paid. (Report, p. 2.)

  The WCJ admitted error in the temporary disability period and recommended correction, which the Appeals Board granted.

  Official decision · page 5 →
• ADJ17739286 · 2024-10-07 · Van Nuys District OfficePsyche AOE/COEapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.8Here, per the WCJ, applicant's unapportioned lumbar injury without consideration of occupation and age is 29% permanent disability. (Report, p. 4.) Applicant's shoulder impairment amounts to 17% permanent disability. Combining 29% with 17% using the Combined Values Chart (CVC) results in 41% permanent disability. Thus, applicant met the 35% SIBTF eligibility threshold.

  The Board found that the applicant's unapportioned combined permanent disability rating for the subsequent injury was 41%, exceeding the 35% threshold required for SIBTF eligibility, based on binding precedent excluding apportionment in the calculation.

  Official decision · page 8 →
• ADJ18866949 · 2024-06-10 · San Francisco District OfficeApportionmentapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.5Defendant, City of Los Angeles has filed this timely and verified petition for reconsideration challenging the November 8, 2023, Arbitrator's decision wherein I found, that Applicant, a police officer was entitled to an unapportioned Award of 33% permanent disability to the lumber spine and left shoulder. Defendant contends by the decision or award this Arbitrator acted without or in excess of her powers; that the evidence does not justify the findings of fact and the findings of fact do not support the order, decision or award. Specifically, Defendant contends it was error to find that apportionment under Labor Code Section 4664(b) was precluded because it was inconsistent with the anti-attribution clause of Labor Code Section 4663(e). Applicant had a prior Award of 17% permanent disability to the low back which Defendant asserts requires apportionment under Labor Code 4664(b). An answer to the petition has been received from Applicant.

  The Appeals Board found that apportionment under Labor Code Section 4664(b) was precluded by the anti-attribution clause of Labor Code Section 4663(e) for the presumptively compensable lumbar spine injury, following the rationale in Bates and Santiago.

  Official decision · page 5 →
• ADJ19139846 · 2024-06-03AOE/COEapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.1Applicant seeks reconsideration of an arbitrator's Findings and Order of March 15, 2024, wherein it was found that "The left shoulder injury [applicant] sustained on October 2, 2022 did not arise out of an occur in the course of employment." The arbitrator thus issued an order that applicant take nothing by way of his claim. In the Opinion on Decision, the arbitrator explained that she found that applicant was not in the course of employment at the time of injury pursuant to Labor Code Section 3660(a)(9) which states the employer is not liable for any injuries which occur during voluntary participation in an off-duty recreational, social, or athletic activity not constituting a part of the employee's work related duties, unless it was a reasonable expectancy of, or was expressly or impliedly required by the employment.

  Applicant was on paid on-call status at the time of injury, which was found to be within the course of employment. The injury occurred while weightlifting during on-call time, which was a reasonable activity under the circumstances. The personal convenience doctrine and relevant case law supported compensability.

  Official decision · page 1 →
• ADJ17557045 · 2024-05-31 · Oxnard District OfficeAOE/COEapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.4IV. DISCUSSION There is no dispute as to applicant's exposure to carcinogens on the job. There is no dispute that after some four years of such employment as a peace officer he developed pancreatic and liver cancer. Petitioner essentially argues that applicant must bear the burden of proof of industrial causation despite the presumption set forth in Labor Code Section 3212.1. Applicant need not prove that the latency period for the development of his cancer is such that his industrial exposure did not cause the cancer. The burden was on petitioner to prove that the industrial exposures are not reasonably linked to the disabling cancer. There must either be no connection to the exposure and the cancer or "any such possible connection is so unlikely as to be absurd or illogical." City of Long Beach v. WCAB (Garcia) (2005) 70 CCC 109. Drs. Enyati and Leoni did not have to establish that applicant cancer was caused by the industrial exposures (though they both so opined). They only had to demonstrate that the connection was not non-existent or absurd or illogical. The medical literature offered by petitioner involves the medical demonstration of causation of certain cancers.

  The petitioner failed to prove that the industrial exposures were not reasonably linked to the disabling cancer or that any such connection was absurd or illogical, thus the presumption was not rebutted.

  Official decision · page 4 →
• ADJ12509226 · 2024-02-29 · Riverside District OfficeStatute of limitationsapplicant prevailed

  Determinative passage · p.17In summary, and based on our review of the record, we conclude that the nature of applicant's disability was not amenable to lay attribution, and therefore required medical advice as to its relation to applicant's work activities for purposes of establishing a date of injury pursuant to section 5405. The first evidence of such advice in the evidentiary record was November 13, 2019. Because the concurrence of applicant's compensable permanent disability and knowledge that such disability was caused by his employment occurred on November 13, 2019, applicant's claim is not barred by the statute of limitations of section 5405. We will affirm the WCJ's March 27, 2020 Finding of Fact, accordingly.

  The applicant's compensable permanent disability and knowledge of its industrial cause occurred on November 13, 2019, within the statute of limitations period, so the claim is not barred.

  Official decision · page 17 →

Also recorded as

The same firm is printed several ways across the decisions, and all of them were counted as one. These are the twelve commonest of 16.

• LEWIS, MARENSTEIN, WICKE, SHERWIN & LEE
• LEWIS, MARENSTEIN, WICKE, SHERWIN & LEE, LLP
• Lewis, Marenstein, Wicke, Sherwin & Lee
• LEWIS MARENSTEIN WICKE SHERWIN & LEE
• LEWIS MARENSTEIN
• LEWIS, MARENSTEIN, WICKE, SHERWIN & LEE LLP
• LEWIS MARENSTEIN WICKE SHERWIN & LEE LLP
• LEWIS, MARENSTEIN, SHERWIN, WICKE & LEE
• LEWIS MARENSTEIN, WICKE, SHEWIN & LEE
• Lewis Marenstein Wicke Sherwin & Lee
• LEWIS, MARENSTEIN, WICKE & SHERWIN
• LEWIS MARENSTEIN WICKE & SHERWIN

Is this your firm and something here is wrong? Tell us and we will fix it. Every figure on this page is a count of released decisions this firm is named in, and the decisions themselves are listed above with the passage each turned on.