California WCABLaw firm

Armstrong Law

Armstrong Law is named in 6 released California WCAB decisions from 2023–2026. The disputes run to AOE/COE (1), Apportionment (1) and Cumulative trauma (1). They were heard most often at Los Angeles, then San Bernardino.

Decisions: 6
Years: 2023–2026
Issues disputed: 3
District offices: 3

What they litigate

Disputed issues across the decisions this firm is named in. Every row opens the decisions it counts.

Who they face

We could not read this firm’s own side from the record, so there is no other side to name.

Carriers and administrators

Adminsure2
Sedgwick Claims Management Services2
Claimquest1
Gallagher Bassett1
Liberty Mutual Northern California1

Where they appear

Los Angeles 2
San Bernardino 2
Van Nuys 2

How the appealed decisions came out

These are decisions that were appealed and published — the tail of a system that mostly settles. Most claims end in a compromise and release or a stipulation and never reach a panel, so nothing below describes how this firm does its work. It describes how a set of appealed disputes came out.

4 for the defense
1 for the applicant
1 returned for more record

Counted over 6 appealed decisions. Not this firm’s book of work.

Decisions

Newest decisions this firm is named in, each with the passage the panel turned on and a link to the official PDF.

ADJ13610807 · 2025-02-03 · San Bernardino District OfficeAOE/COEapplicant prevailed
Determinative passage · p.3(1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1692, 1701 [58 Cal.Comp.Cases 313], emphasis added.) As discussed by the WCJ, applicant met her burden of proving injury AOE/COE, based in part on the opinions of panel Qualified Medical Evaluator (QME) in cardiology Stuart Fischer, M.D. (Exhibits 1A - 1G) and panel QME in neurology Pedram Navab, M.D. (Exhibits 2A - 2H). Although the WCJ and both QMEs refer to "cardiac arrest" we note that this is not a body part. Additionally, we note that it is axiomatic that an injury must be to a body part and, as such, any finding of injury AOE/COE must identify at least one body part. (See Lab. Code, § 3600(a), 5401(a); Clark, supra, at 297-298.) Therefore we will amend Findings of Fact No. 1 and No. 2 to find that applicant sustained injury to her heart.
The WCJ and QMEs Fischer and Navab provided substantial medical evidence that applicant's sudden cardiac arrest was industrially related, meeting the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and reasonable probability standard.
Official decision · page 3 →
ADJ15113297 · 2025-01-03 · Van Nuys District OfficeApportionmentdefendant prevailed
Determinative passage · p.6As early as 03/26/2019, the patient had moderate degenerative x-ray changes in the right hip and had already undergone a left total hip replacement. These factors indicate that the vast majority of the patient's impairment is due to factors that predate the work injury. Clearly, the degenerative changes seen will inextricably lead to end-stage osteoarthritis in (sic) the need for hip replacement. It is my best clinical estimate that 90% of her right hip and impairment is due to factors that predate the work injury and the remaining 10% is due to the specific work injury. (Exhibit Y2, PQME report of Lawrence Borelli, M.D. dated 3/3/2023, page 17).
The WCJ and WCAB found Dr. Borelli's apportionment opinion on the right hip to be substantial medical evidence and consistent with legal standards, supporting 90% nonindustrial apportionment and 10% industrial causation.
Official decision · page 6 →
ADJ10644429 · 2023-10-20 · Van Nuys District OfficeCumulative traumaremanded
Determinative passage · p.8In this case, pursuant to section 3208.1, AME Dr. Hatch determined that applicant sustained industrial industry, however her testimony is equivocal as to the date of injury and whether one or more periods of cumulative trauma exist. Therefore, while there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that applicant's injury was AOE/COE, we cannot determine based on the record before whether applicant sustained one or two cumulative injuries.
The record was insufficient to determine whether applicant sustained one or two periods of cumulative trauma; further development of the record is required.
Official decision · page 8 →
ADJ13610807 · 2026-08-20 · San Bernardino District OfficeReconsideration / removaldefendant prevailed
Determinative passage · p.1Defendant, Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center, seeks disqualification of the workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) based upon the allegation that the WCJ has made unqualified opinions as to the merits of the case. We have received an answer from applicant. The WCJ filed a Report and Recommendation on Petition for Disqualification (Report) recommending that we dismiss or deny disqualification. We have considered the allegations of the Petition for Disqualification and the contents of the WCJ’s Report. Based on our review of the record and based upon the WCJ’s analysis of the merits contained in the WCJ’s Report, we will deny disqualification. Labor Code 1 section 5311 provides that a party may seek to disqualify a WCJ upon any one or more of the grounds specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 641. (§ 5311; see also Code Civ.
The WCAB panel found no grounds for disqualification as the WCJ's opinions were not fixed and could be changed upon further evidence and argument, and no bias was demonstrated.
Official decision · page 1 →
ADJ13367853 · 2026-01-05 · Los Angeles District OfficeReconsideration / removaldefendant prevailed
Determinative passage · p.6As the moving party, Applicant has the burden of proof to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, she should be relieved from the settlement agreement she entered into with Defendant. (See Lab. Code, § 5705 [the burden of proof rests upon the party with the affirmative of the issue]; see also Lab. Code, § 3202.5 ["All parties and lien claimants shall meet the evidentiary burden of proof on all issues by a preponderance of the evidence"].) Applicant seeks to set aside the Order Approving the Compromise and Release essentially claiming there.
Applicant failed to meet burden of proof to show fraud, mistake, or duress to set aside settlement; no evidence of deception or material falsehoods; settlement was explained and voluntarily signed.
Official decision · page 6 →

Also recorded as

The same firm is printed several ways across the decisions, and all of them were counted as one. This is every spelling behind the figures above.

ARMSTRONG LAW GROUP, APC
ARMSTRONG LAW GROUP
Armstrong Law

Is this your firm and something here is wrong? Tell us and we will fix it. Every figure on this page is a count of released decisions this firm is named in, and the decisions themselves are listed above with the passage each turned on.

Also on this

Private workspace

Your case already resembles someone else’s. Find whose.

Paste the dispute. The extractor builds the factors, the search finds the decisions the same facts won, and the matter stays saved. Free account.

Start a matter Search without an account →

How the appealed decisions came out

4 for the defense

1 for the applicant

1 returned for more record

Counted over 6 appealed decisions. Not this firm’s book of work.

Decisions

Newest decisions this firm is named in, each with the passage the panel turned on and a link to the official PDF.

ADJ13610807 · 2025-02-03 · San Bernardino District OfficeAOE/COEapplicant prevailed

Determinative passage · p.3(1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1692, 1701 [58 Cal.Comp.Cases 313], emphasis added.) As discussed by the WCJ, applicant met her burden of proving injury AOE/COE, based in part on the opinions of panel Qualified Medical Evaluator (QME) in cardiology Stuart Fischer, M.D. (Exhibits 1A - 1G) and panel QME in neurology Pedram Navab, M.D. (Exhibits 2A - 2H). Although the WCJ and both QMEs refer to "cardiac arrest" we note that this is not a body part. Additionally, we note that it is axiomatic that an injury must be to a body part and, as such, any finding of injury AOE/COE must identify at least one body part. (See Lab. Code, § 3600(a), 5401(a); Clark, supra, at 297-298.) Therefore we will amend Findings of Fact No. 1 and No. 2 to find that applicant sustained injury to her heart.

The WCJ and QMEs Fischer and Navab provided substantial medical evidence that applicant's sudden cardiac arrest was industrially related, meeting the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and reasonable probability standard.

Official decision · page 3 →

ADJ15113297 · 2025-01-03 · Van Nuys District OfficeApportionmentdefendant prevailed

Determinative passage · p.6As early as 03/26/2019, the patient had moderate degenerative x-ray changes in the right hip and had already undergone a left total hip replacement. These factors indicate that the vast majority of the patient's impairment is due to factors that predate the work injury. Clearly, the degenerative changes seen will inextricably lead to end-stage osteoarthritis in (sic) the need for hip replacement. It is my best clinical estimate that 90% of her right hip and impairment is due to factors that predate the work injury and the remaining 10% is due to the specific work injury. (Exhibit Y2, PQME report of Lawrence Borelli, M.D. dated 3/3/2023, page 17).

The WCJ and WCAB found Dr. Borelli's apportionment opinion on the right hip to be substantial medical evidence and consistent with legal standards, supporting 90% nonindustrial apportionment and 10% industrial causation.

Official decision · page 6 →

ADJ10644429 · 2023-10-20 · Van Nuys District OfficeCumulative traumaremanded

Determinative passage · p.8In this case, pursuant to section 3208.1, AME Dr. Hatch determined that applicant sustained industrial industry, however her testimony is equivocal as to the date of injury and whether one or more periods of cumulative trauma exist. Therefore, while there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that applicant's injury was AOE/COE, we cannot determine based on the record before whether applicant sustained one or two cumulative injuries.

The record was insufficient to determine whether applicant sustained one or two periods of cumulative trauma; further development of the record is required.

Official decision · page 8 →

ADJ13610807 · 2026-08-20 · San Bernardino District OfficeReconsideration / removaldefendant prevailed

Determinative passage · p.1Defendant, Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center, seeks disqualification of the workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) based upon the allegation that the WCJ has made unqualified opinions as to the merits of the case. We have received an answer from applicant. The WCJ filed a Report and Recommendation on Petition for Disqualification (Report) recommending that we dismiss or deny disqualification. We have considered the allegations of the Petition for Disqualification and the contents of the WCJ’s Report. Based on our review of the record and based upon the WCJ’s analysis of the merits contained in the WCJ’s Report, we will deny disqualification. Labor Code 1 section 5311 provides that a party may seek to disqualify a WCJ upon any one or more of the grounds specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 641. (§ 5311; see also Code Civ.

The WCAB panel found no grounds for disqualification as the WCJ's opinions were not fixed and could be changed upon further evidence and argument, and no bias was demonstrated.

Official decision · page 1 →

ADJ13367853 · 2026-01-05 · Los Angeles District OfficeReconsideration / removaldefendant prevailed

Determinative passage · p.6As the moving party, Applicant has the burden of proof to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, she should be relieved from the settlement agreement she entered into with Defendant. (See Lab. Code, § 5705 [the burden of proof rests upon the party with the affirmative of the issue]; see also Lab. Code, § 3202.5 ["All parties and lien claimants shall meet the evidentiary burden of proof on all issues by a preponderance of the evidence"].) Applicant seeks to set aside the Order Approving the Compromise and Release essentially claiming there.

Applicant failed to meet burden of proof to show fraud, mistake, or duress to set aside settlement; no evidence of deception or material falsehoods; settlement was explained and voluntarily signed.

Official decision · page 6 →