ADJ19473797 — California WCAB decision

What the panel ordered

Petition for Reconsideration granted; final decision after reconsideration deferred pending further review.

Defendant filed a Petition for Reconsideration and Removal of the WCJ's September 12, 2025 Findings and Order; the WCAB granted the Petition for Reconsideration and deferred final decision pending further review of the merits.

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What was disputed, and how it came out

Each issue the panel decided, with the reasoning it gave. An outcome is what this panel did on this record — not a rule, and not a prediction.

Other disputed issueMixed

The WCJ found a good-faith personnel action as an affirmative defense, which was challenged by defendant. The WCAB granted reconsideration to further review this issue.

From the decision · page 1Defendant seeks reconsideration and removal of the September 12, 2025 Findings and Order (F&O) issued by the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). Therein, the WCJ found in pertinent part that applicant sustained an injury to his psyche arising out of and in the course of employment (AOE/COE) while employed by defendant during the period from January 18, 2023 to May 27, 2024; that defendant demonstrated there was a good-faith personnel action; and that the record lacks sufficient evidence to determine permanent and stationary date, permanent disability, apportionment and the need for further medical treatment. The WCJ deferred those issues, ordered that the parties develop the record on those issues; and ordered that the parties return to the respective psych doctors to complete a Rolda analysis and issue a final report.

What the panel did with the medical opinions

The role the physician served, and the weight the opinion carried. Physicians are named here as the decision names them; we do not score them.

PTPRelied upon · psychiatry

Diagnosed applicant with PTSD and major depression; found occupational mental stressors as predominant cause; found temporary total psychiatric disability; apportioned 100% disability to occupational stressors; found permanent disability preventing return to firefighting but allowing other work.

Dr. Dorsey's detailed diagnosis and causation opinion supported the WCJ's finding of injury AOE/COE.

From the decision · page 2Richard Dorsey, a psychiatrist, who served as applicant's primary treatment provider (PTP). In his Initial Psychiatric Evaluation, dated June 7, 2024, Dr. Dorsey diagnosed applicant with PTSD and major depression, explaining that applicant's claim was based on: [T]he following sequence of events...: 1. He was exposed to all the usual stressors of a firefighter/first response namely heat, danger, and destruction. 2. On one instance, he recalls an unsuccessful attempt to save a small child who pronounced dead on arrival to hospital despite his resuscitative efforts. 3. On another case, he was involved in a DUI auto accident resulting in a death of two parents plus subsequent death of both children in the car.

QMEPartially credited · psychology

Initially diagnosed PTSD in remission with occupational stressors; later questioned applicant's veracity and found no substantial evidence of permanent psychiatric disability.

Dr. Thaler's later supplemental reports questioned the diagnosis and causation, challenging the injury finding.

From the decision · page 4(Joint Ex. D, at p. 1.) He noted that applicant had not discussed "the full circumstances of his work history" in the initial evaluation, and based on this concern, he questioned applicant's "veracity" and concluded that the applicant "did not manifest signs of PTSD at the time I evaluated him," and thus additional "psychological records from Dr. Dorsey and other providers" as well as "objective test data" were required to determine if applicant had PTSD. (Id. at p. 3.) After reviewing Dr. Dorsey's reports, Dr. Thaler concluded in his October 27, 2024 supplemental report that "I do not have substantial evidence that [applicant] is permanently psychiatrically disabled." (Joint Exh. C, at p. 3.)

The rules the panel named

Authorities as the decision cited them, with how this panel applied each one.

Rolda v. Pitney Bowes, Inc. (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 241

Multilevel analysis for industrial psychiatric injury with good faith personnel action affirmative defense per Rolda v. Pitney Bowes, Inc. (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 241 (Appeals Board en banc).

WCJ determines actual events of employment; physician determines causation threshold for psychiatric injury.

From the decision · page 8A multilevel analysis is required when an industrial psychiatric injury is alleged and the employer raises the affirmative defense of a lawful, nondiscriminatory, good faith personnel action. (Rolda v. Pitney Bowes, Inc. (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 241 (Appeals Board en banc).) Pursuant to Rolda, whether the psychiatric injury involves actual events of employment is a factual/legal determination for the WCJ. Alternatively, whether actual events of employment meet the causation threshold for a psychiatric injury is a medical determination. While the WCJ determines what constitute actual events of employment, the physician determines whether the psychiatric injury was predominantly caused by the event(s), or whether the psychiatric injury was substantially caused by the event(s) if the injury resulted from being a victim of a violent act or direct exposure to a significant violent act.

Escobedo v. Marshalls (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604

Substantial evidence standard for medical opinions per Escobedo v. Marshalls (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604 (Appeals Board en banc).

Medical opinion must be framed in reasonable medical probability, not speculative, based on facts and adequate exam, with reasoning.

From the decision · page 7It is well established that decisions by the Appeals Board must be supported by substantial evidence. (Lab. Code, § 5903, 5952(d); Lamb v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274, 281 [39 Cal.Comp.Cases 310]; Garza v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312, 318-319 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 500]; LeVesque v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 16].) To constitute substantial evidence "... a medical opinion must be framed in terms of reasonable medical probability, it must not be speculative, it must be based on pertinent facts and on an adequate examination and history, and it must set forth reasoning in support of its conclusions." (Escobedo v. Marshalls (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604, 621 (Appeals Bd. en banc).) The relevant and considered opinion of one physician may constitute substantial evidence, even if inconsistent with other medical opinions. (Place v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 372, 378 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 525].) A WCJ's credibility determination(s) are given great weight because the WCJ had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness(es). (Garza v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312, 318-319 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 500].)

Labor Code section 3212.15

Presumption for firefighters diagnosed with PTSD under Labor Code section 3212.15.

Provides presumption easing burden of proof for firefighters with PTSD.

From the decision · page 9employees, including firefighters, who are diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. (Lab. Code, § 3212.15(a), (b), (c).) Although the applicability of the section 3212.15 presumption was not listed as an issue at trial in this matter, it was raised and argued by applicant in his post-trial brief and requires further consideration here. (Lab. Code, § 3212.15; 8/11/25 MOH, at p. 2; Applicant's Post-Trial Brief, at pp. 3-5.)

ADJ19473797 · December 16, 2025

What the panel ordered

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The facts that decided it

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