Labor Code section 5412
Date of injury in cumulative injury cases is when employee first suffered disability and knew or should have known it was caused by employment (Lab. Code, 5412).
The WCJ must determine the date of injury under section 5412 to assess timeliness of claim.
From the decision · page 4Pursuant to section 3208.1:
An injury may be either: (a) `specific' occurring as the result of one incident
or exposure which causes disability or need for medical treatment;
or (b) `cumulative' occurring as repetitive mentally or physically traumatic
activities extending over a period of time, the combined effect of which
causes any disability or need for medical treatment. The date of a
cumulative trauma injury shall be the date determined under []5412.
(Lab. Code, § 3208.1.)
In addition, pursuant to section 5412:
The date of injury in cases of occupational disease or cumulative injuries is that
date upon which the employee first suffered disability therefrom and either knew,
or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that such disability
was caused by his present or prior employment.
(Lab. Code, § 5412.)
"Disability," as used in section 5412, is evidence that there is either "compensable
Plotnick v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal. 3d 622
Medical treatment for earlier injury overlapping with subsequent injury may toll statute of limitations under section 5405(c) (Plotnick v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.).
The WCJ must determine when CIGA last paid benefits to apply section 5405(c) tolling.
From the decision · page 5Finally, in De Lay v. CIGA (2019) 84 Cal.Comp.Cases 934, the Appeals Board rescinded
the WCJ's decision that section 5405 barred CIGA's petition for reimbursement for a subsequent
injury against a permissibly self-insured employer for benefits paid by CIGA up through the date
of trial. The Appeals Board relied on the California Supreme Court case of Plotnick v.
Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal. 3d 622, 623-626 [35 Cal.Comp. Cases 13]), holding
that medical treatment provided by an employer for an earlier injury that also overlaps with
treatment for a subsequent injury may toll the statute of limitations for the subsequent injury under
section 5405(c). In Plotnick, the injured worker sustained successive injuries to the same body
part. (Id. at pp. 623-624.) The Supreme Court found that "[i]t follows inevitably" that any medical
treatment received from the employer for a previous injury "must to some extent have been
designed to relieve [the injured employee] from the effects" of the subsequent injury, even when
the treatment "may also had as their purpose to relieve petitioner from the effects of the original
injury." (Id. at pp. 625-626.) The Supreme Court therefore held that filing of the claim was timely
within the one year of the provision of medical treatment pursuant to section 5405(c). (Id.)