Authorities as the decision cited them, with how this panel applied each one.
Cortez v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 596, 599, fn. 5
Removal is an extraordinary remedy rarely exercised by the Appeals Board; granted only if substantial prejudice or irreparable harm will result if removal is not granted.
The petition did not persuade the Board that substantial prejudice or irreparable harm would result if removal was denied.
From the decision · page 1Removal is an extraordinary remedy rarely exercised by the Appeals Board. (Cortez v.
Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 596, 599, fn. 5 [71 Cal.Comp.Cases 155];
Kleemann v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 274, 280, fn. 2 [70
Cal.Comp.Cases 133].) The Appeals Board will grant removal only if the petitioner shows that
substantial prejudice or irreparable harm will result if removal is not granted. (Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 8, § 10955(a); see also Cortez, supra; Kleemann, supra.) Also, the petitioner must demonstrate
that reconsideration will not be an adequate remedy if a final decision adverse to the petitioner
ultimately issues. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10955(a).) Here, for the reasons stated in the WCJ's
report, we are not persuaded that substantial prejudice or irreparable harm will result if removal is
denied and/or that reconsideration will not be an adequate remedy if the matter ultimately proceeds
Labor Code section 5311; Code Civ. Proc., 641(f) and (g)
A party may seek to disqualify a WCJ upon grounds specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 641, including bias or fixed opinion on merits.
The petition did not set forth sufficient verified facts to establish disqualification under these grounds.
From the decision · page 2To the extent the petition contends that the WCJ should be disqualified, Labor Code section
5311 provides that a party may seek to disqualify a WCJ upon any one or more of the grounds
specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 641. (Lab. Code, § 5311; see also Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 641.) Among the grounds for disqualification under section 641 are that the WCJ has "formed
or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to the merits of the action" (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 641(f)) or that the WCJ has demonstrated "[t]he existence of a state of mind... evincing enmity
against or bias toward either party" (Code Civ. Proc., § 641(g)).
Kreling v. Superior Court (1944) 25 Cal.2d 305, 310-311
Expressions of opinion by a judge in discharge of official duties are not evidence of bias or prejudice under section 641(g).
The Board found no evidence of bias or prejudice in the WCJ's expressed opinions and rulings.
From the decision · page 3Also, it is "well settled... that the expressions of opinion uttered by a judge, in what he
conceives to be a discharge of his official duties, are not evidence of bias or prejudice" under
section 641(g) (Kreling, supra, 25 Cal.2d at pp. 310-311; accord: Mackie, supra, 154 Cal.App.2d
at p. 400) and that "[e]rroneous rulings against a litigant, even when numerous and continuous,
form no ground for a charge of bias or prejudice, especially when they are subject to review"
(McEwen v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. (1916) 172 Cal. 6, 11; accord: Mackie, supra, 154 Cal.App.2d
at p. 400.) Similarly, "when the state of mind of the trial judge appears to be adverse to one of the
parties but is based upon actual observance of the witnesses and the evidence given during the trial
of an action, it does not amount to that prejudice against a litigant which disqualifies" the judge
under section 641(g). (Kreling, supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 312; see also Moulton Niguel Water Dist.
v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219 ["When making a ruling, a judge interprets the
evidence, weighs credibility, and makes findings. In doing so, the judge necessarily makes and
expresses determinations in favor of and against parties. How could it be otherwise? We will not
hold that every statement a judge makes to explain his or her reasons for ruling against a party
constitutes evidence of judicial bias."].)