ADJ11141161 · July 8, 2026

The WCJ's findings on good faith personnel actions were unclear and the QME's medical opinion was insufficient to determine substantial causation; thus, the matter was remanded for further proceedings to clarify the actual events and obtain substantial medical evidence.

From the decision · page 4The sole issue raised in this case is whether the WCJ properly determined that the good faith personnel action defense does not bar compensation for applicant’s psychiatric injury. More specifically, defendant challenges the WCJ’s determination that applicant’s psychiatric injury was not “substantially caused” by good faith personnel actions, as required by section 3208.3(h). (Lab. Code, § 3208.3(h).) Section 3208.3 governs claims for psychiatric injury. Section 3208.3 provides, in relevant part: In order to establish that a psychiatric injury is compensable, an employee shall demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that actual events of employment were predominant as to all causes combined of the psychiatric injury.

The WCJ's opinion did not clearly identify which actual events of employment were good faith personnel actions, making it impossible for the QME to provide a substantial medical opinion on substantial causation.

Favours neutral

Without clear identification of good faith personnel actions, the medical opinion on substantial causation was insufficient, necessitating remand for further proceedings.

From the decision · page 8247 [“[T]he WCJ must…articulate the basis for his or her findings in a decision which addresses all the relevant issues raised by the criteria set forth in Labor Code section 3208.3.”]; Lamb, supra; Garza, supra; LeVesque, supra.) Unlike “predominant cause,” which does not call for or require a detailed breakdown of the role that each individual event of employment played in causing the injury, determining “substantial causation” requires a more detailed analysis. The fourth prong of Rolda requires the evaluating physician(s) to parse the factors of causation and offer an opinion as to the percentage of causation for each. (Rolda, supra, 66 Cal.Comp.Cases at p. 246.) Dr. Hirokawa’s May 2, 2018 report discusses a variety of potential factors that may have contributed to applicant’s psychiatric condition. (App. Exh. 5, pp. 15-20.) However, Dr. Hirokawa does not address each of the various factors individually and does not assign percentages of causation to each factor. Moreover, because the WCJ’s findings did not clearly identify the good faith personnel actions that contributed to applicant’s psychiatric injury, any percentage breakdowns by Dr. Hirokawa may have been based on incomplete information and therefore

Diagnosed anxiety disorder; opined that predominant cause (greater than 50%) of psychological symptoms was work stress (approximately 90%), with about 80% of work stress due to personnel actions by supervisor; left determination of legality and good faith of personnel actions to trier of fact.

Dr. Hirokawa provided a medical opinion on causation and predominant cause of psychiatric injury but did not assign percentages to individual events or address substantial causation related to good faith personnel actions, limiting the opinion's sufficiency.

From the decision · page 2Dr. Hirokawa diagnosed applicant with anxiety disorder. Dr. Hirokawa opined that the predominant (greater than 50%) cause of applicant’s psychological condition was industrial. Specifically, Dr. Hirokawa stated: Causation:

Labor Code section 3208.3(h)

Labor Code section 3208.3(h) - no compensation for psychiatric injury substantially caused by lawful, nondiscriminatory, good faith personnel action

The WCJ must determine if the good faith personnel action defense bars compensation by assessing if the injury was substantially caused by such actions, with the burden on the employer to prove this.

From the decision · page 4The sole issue raised in this case is whether the WCJ properly determined that the good faith personnel action defense does not bar compensation for applicant’s psychiatric injury. More specifically, defendant challenges the WCJ’s determination that applicant’s psychiatric injury was not “substantially caused” by good faith personnel actions, as required by section 3208.3(h). (Lab. Code, § 3208.3(h).) Section 3208.3 governs claims for psychiatric injury. Section 3208.3 provides, in relevant part: In order to establish that a psychiatric injury is compensable, an employee shall demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that actual events of employment were predominant as to all causes combined of the psychiatric injury.

Applicant's testimony about supervisor's conduct including grabbing shoulder hard, yelling, limiting lunch break, and directing to take toys to church, which were found not to be good faith personnel actions