Authorities as the decision cited them, with how this panel applied each one.
Jones v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 476
Jones v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 476
Applied to the WCJ's discretion to choose among conflicting medical opinions
From the decision · page 5The relevant and considered opinion of one physician, though inconsistent with other
medical opinions, may constitute substantial evidence. (Le Vesque v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals
Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627, 639 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 16].) The WCJ is empowered to choose among
conflicting medical reports and rely on those deemed most persuasive. (Jones v. Workmen's
Comp. Appeals Bd. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 476, 479 [33 Cal.Comp.Cases 221].) There is nothing in the
Labor Code Section 4663
Applied to apportionment of permanent disability
From the decision · page 4Apportionment of the cause of the permanent impairment due to coronary artery
disease is considered pursuant to Labor Code Section 4663 as clarified by the
Escobedo decision. In my opinion, it is reasonably medically probable that the
coronary artery disease developed as a result of non-industrial factors. That
being said, the stress occurring in the workplace as the applicant has described
tipped the condition over the edge and resulted in the need for bypass surgery.
On that basis, I believe there is a reasonably medial probable basis to apportion
75% of the cause of the permanent impairment/disability to non-industrial
factors and apportion 25% to the perceived workplace stress as described above.
Escobedo v. Marshalls (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604
Escobedo v. Marshalls (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604
Applied to requirements for substantial medical evidence on apportionment
From the decision · page 4asymptomatic prior conditions (see, e.g. Escobedo v. Marshalls (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604,
Huston v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 856
Huston v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 856
Applied to temporary disability entitlement period
From the decision · page 3B. Temporary Disability
Dr. Capen opined that applicant was temporarily totally disabled from November 11, 2015
through February 21, 2016 as a result of heart injury. (August 3, 2017 report at p. 51.) These
dates are consistent with applicant's testimony that he was off work for three months after his
surgery and returned to work in February. (Minutes of Hearing and Summary of Evidence of
February 13, 2019 trial at p. 9.) We therefore find temporary disability corresponding to those
dates.
Le Vesque v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627
Le Vesque v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627
Applied to the WCJ's discretion to choose among conflicting medical opinions
From the decision · page 5The relevant and considered opinion of one physician, though inconsistent with other
medical opinions, may constitute substantial evidence. (Le Vesque v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals
Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627, 639 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 16].) The WCJ is empowered to choose among
conflicting medical reports and rely on those deemed most persuasive. (Jones v. Workmen's
Comp. Appeals Bd. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 476, 479 [33 Cal.Comp.Cases 221].) There is nothing in the
State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Workers' Comp.Appeals Bd. (Rodarte) (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 998
State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Workers' Comp.Appeals Bd. (Rodarte) (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 998
Applied to deny temporary disability without wage loss evidence
From the decision · page 6However, we will delete any finding of temporary disability. Applicant testified that he
worked from his return from his heart temporary disability on February 21, 2016 until his
retirement in July of 2017. (Minutes of Hearing and Summary of Evidence of February 13, 2019
trial at p. 9.) There was no evidence or allegation that applicant retired due to any disability or
defendant not accommodating applicant's work restrictions. In State Compensation Ins. Fund v.
Workers' Comp.Appeals Bd. (Rodarte) (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 998, 1003 [69 Cal.Comp.Cases
579], the Court of Appeal made clear that neither medical treatment nor modified work restrictions
without wage loss, in and of themselves, are sufficient to constitute "disability." "[T]here is no
compensable temporary disability until the worker suffers wage loss." (Rodarte, 119 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1003.) "[T]emporary disability indemnity is payable during the injured worker's healing
period from the injury until the worker has recovered sufficiently to return to work, or until his/her
condition reaches a permanent and stationary status." (Huston v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.
(1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 856, 868 [44 Cal.Comp.Cases 798].) Here, applicant did not present any
evidence supporting wage loss as a result of his orthopedic injury. We therefore find that applicant
did not prove entitlement to temporary disability in this case.